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Mayo1 has stirred concern among members of the
tax bar. By daring to say that the IRS is just like any
other federal agency, the Supreme Court has left the
tax bar scrambling to accumulate the expertise it
needs to navigate the rules of administrative law.
The initial focus of attention has been the appli-
cation of Chevron,2 the immediate subject of Mayo.
Tax practitioners quickly learned that Chevron re-
quires a two-step analysis: whether the words of the
statute are clear and, if not, whether the adminis-
trator’s action is reasonable. That test may seem
pretty simple. But it turns out that in the adminis-
trative law community, the precise application of
Chevron is unclear. Since 2007, the American Bar
Association Administrative Law Review has pub-
lished nine articles with Chevron in their title,3 and
about 43 articles have cited Chevron in that time.
But beyond Chevron, the tax bar recognizes that if
IRS regulations are like any other agency’s regula-
tions, then they are governed by the same rules that
govern other agency regulations and specifically are
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).4
Tax practitioners also will presumably need to
1Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011), Doc 2011-609, 2011 TNT 8-10.
2Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3Randolph J. May, ‘‘Defining Deference Down, Again: Inde-
pendent Agencies, Chevron Deference, and Fox,’’ 62 Admin. L.
Rev. 433 (2010); William S. Jordan III, ‘‘Chevron and Hearing
Rights: An Unintended Combination,’’ 61 Admin. L. Rev. 249
(2009); John S. Kane, ‘‘Refining Chevron — Restoring Judicial
Review to Protect Religious Refugees,’’ 60 Admin. L. Rev. 513
(2008); Abigail R. Moncrieff, ‘‘Reincarnating the ‘Major Ques-
tions’ Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Nonin-
terference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong),’’ 60
Admin. L. Rev. 593 (2008); Ann Graham, ‘‘Searching For Chevron
in Muddy Waters: The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of
Agency Regulations,’’ 60 Admin. L. Rev. 229 (2008); Elizabeth V.
Foote, ‘‘Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How
Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It
Matters,’’ 59 Admin. L. Rev. 673 (2007); Linda Jellum, ‘‘Chevron’s
Demise: A Survey of Chevron From Infancy to Senescence,’’ 59
Admin. L. Rev. 725 (2007); Daniel J. Gifford, ‘‘The Emerging
Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent,
Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy,’’ 59 Admin.
L. Rev. 783 (2007); David S. Rubenstein, ‘‘Putting the Immigra-
tion Rule of Lenity in Its Proper Place: A Tool of Last Resort
After Chevron,’’ 59 Admin. L. Rev. 479 (2007). The titles of some
of the articles suggest that all is not well (or at least clear).
45 U.S.C. section 551ff.
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become more expert in the APA, although the act’s
significance certainly has not been ignored by the
tax community.5
In this report, I hope to identify some of the
major issues in the judicial review of administrative
actions, particularly as they apply to tax rules. If I
am successful, the reader will have more questions
after reading the report than before.
I. Operation of the APA
Here is the barest outline of administrative prac-
tice as it pertains to the promulgation of agency
rules: The APA requires agencies to publish a notice
of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.6 The
notice containing the proposed rule should include
a statement of the legal basis of the rule. The public
must then be given the opportunity to comment on
the proposed rule.7 After considering those com-
ments, the agency can promulgate the final rules
with a statement of their basis and purpose.8
Those provisions mean that regulations pub-
lished with notice and comment comply with the
APA.9 However, there are a number of important
exceptions. The most important for our purposes is
that interpretive rules are not subject to the notice
and comment requirement.10 Also, notice and com-
ment are not required when the agency ‘‘for good
cause finds’’ that they are ‘‘impracticable, unneces-
sary, or contrary to the public interest.’’11 The
agency must include its findings and the reasons
behind them when it publishes the rule. Finally,
notice and comment are not required for ‘‘rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice.’’12
The rule’s effective date normally cannot be
sooner than 30 days after publication unless the rule
grants an exemption, the rule is an interpretive rule,
or there is good cause for a different effective date
(which must be published with the rule).13
II. The Deference Standards
The issue highlighted in Mayo is the deference
that is to be given to administrative rules. There are
two main standards of deference given to adminis-
trative pronouncements. Some pronouncements —
sometimes referred to as legislative regulations —
get Chevron deference. Lesser pronouncements —
sometimes called interpretive regulations — get
only Skidmore deference.14
As mentioned before, Chevron deference involves
a two-step analysis:
When a court reviews an agency’s construc-
tion of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always,
is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own con-
struction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpreta-
tion. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambigu-
ous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.15
Essentially, Congress has allowed an agency to
make a rule that will bind the courts. The agency’s
rule can be disregarded only if it is contrary to the
statute on which it is purportedly based or is not a
permissible construction of the statute. The court’s
view of whether the agency, in interpreting an
ambiguous statute, has taken the best approach to
the issue is of no consequence.
Skidmore deference is not as sweeping:
We consider that the . . . interpretations . . . of
the Administrator . . . while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority,
do constitute a body of experience and in-
formed judgments to which courts and liti-
gants may properly resort for guidance. The
weight of such a judgment . . . will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consid-
eration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis-
tency with earlier and later pronouncements,
5See, e.g., Peter A. Lowy and Juan F. Vasquez, ‘‘How Revenue
Rulings Are Made and the Implications of That Process for
Judicial Deference,’’ 101 J. Tax’n 230 (2004); Michael Asimow,
‘‘Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regu-
lations,’’ 44 Tax Law. 343 (1991).
65 U.S.C. section 553(b).
75 U.S.C. section 553(c).
8Id.
9See infra text accompanying notes 18-21 for the possibility
that rules promulgated in other ways may get the same defer-
ence as those promulgated under notice and comment.
105 U.S.C. section 553(b)(A).
115 U.S.C. section 553(b)(B). The good cause exceptions are
discussed in Part IX, below.
125 U.S.C. section 553(b)(A).
135 U.S.C. section 553(d).
14323 U.S. 134 (1944). A separate aspect of deference is that
the Court gives deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations. Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Auer
v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). This is discussed in Part VIII,
below.
15Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843.
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and all those factors which give power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.16
When Skidmore applies, the issue is narrower.
Courts should defer to agency rules because the
agency has expertise in the area and deals with the
full scope of the issues all the time. However, the
court can still conclude that it is unpersuaded by
the agency’s reasoning and opt for a decision it
prefers.
The current state of the law is, as described
above, to give the lesser Skidmore deference to
interpretive regulations under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Christensen v. Harris County.17
The Court in United States v. Mead Corp.18 indi-
cated that it is prepared to extend Chevron deference
to some pronouncements that are not legislative
regulations. The exact boundaries of the Mead rule
are unclear.19 No Supreme Court decision has relied
on Mead to give Chevron deference to a rule that was
not promulgated with notice and comment pro-
cedures. Any deviation from the notice and com-
ment requirement would be most important in the
tax area if the IRS wanted the courts to grant
Chevron deference to revenue rulings. There has
been serious discussion regarding whether IRS pro-
nouncements other than regulations, such as rev-
enue rulings, might be subject to Chevron
deference.20 However, the Justice Department has
indicated that it will not argue for Chevron defer-
ence for revenue rulings and revenue procedures.21
The description above makes it seem that there
are reasonably clear lines separating types of defer-
ence and the circumstances under which they are
appropriately applied. Studies of Supreme Court
decisions have raised serious questions about that
conclusion, pointing to many cases when justices
applied different rules of deference, or no clear rule
at all.22 That helps explain the flood of academic
literature questioning the actual effects of Chevron
in the courts.
III. Legislative vs. Interpretive Regulations
Before Mayo, it was not clear that the Supreme
Court applied the normal Chevron rules of defer-
ence in tax cases. As the Court recognized in Mayo,
its prior decisions sometimes allowed courts to use
a lesser form of deference based on the test in
National Muffler.23 Also, before Mayo, tax practitio-
ners distinguished legislative regulations from
interpretive regulations based on whether the IRS
was specifically authorized to issue the regulations
(for example, the consolidated return regulations
authorized by section 1502).24 At the time, the
significance of making the distinction seemed
limited. A practitioner might have wanted to assert
that a regulation was legislative if the IRS had
failed to comply strictly with the rules of the APA
in connection with legislative regulations.25
The Supreme Court in Mayo rejected the applica-
tion of National Muffler rather than Chevron to tax
cases.26 Moreover, on the question of which tax
regulations should be viewed as legislative regula-
tions to which Chevron would apply, the opinion
states: ‘‘Our inquiry in that regard does not turn on
whether Congress’s delegation of authority was
general or specific.’’27 And, as the Court recognizes,
the regulation in Mayo was issued ‘‘pursuant to the
explicit authorization to ‘prescribe all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement’ of the Internal
Revenue Code.’ 26 U.S.C. section 7805(a).’’28 In
other words, the explicit authorization of the IRS in
16Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see the discussion of Skidmore
deference, below, Part VI.
17529 U.S. 576 (2000).
18533 U.S. 218 (2001); see also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
222 (2002) (dicta indicates that the Court would grant Chevron
deference to a rule announced through ‘‘less formal’’ means
than notice and comment); Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S.
106 (2002) (Chevron deference ‘‘does not necessarily require an
agency’s exercise of express notice-and-comment rulemaking
power’’).
19See Lisa S. Bressman, ‘‘How Mead Has Muddled Judicial
Review of Agency Action,’’ 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443 (2005).
20See generally Kristin E. Hickman, ‘‘IRS Guidance: The No
Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation,’’ 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev.
239 (2009).
21Marie Sapirie, ‘‘DOJ Won’t Argue for Chevron Deference for
Revenue Rulings and Procedures, Official Says,’’ Tax Notes, May
16, 2011, p. 674, Doc 2011-9936, 2011 TNT 90-7. This issue is
discussed further in Part VII, below.
22E.g., Cano N. Raso and William N. Eskridge Jr., ‘‘Chevron as
a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Moti-
vates Justices in Agency Deference Cases,’’ 110 Columb. L. Rev.
1727 (2010).
23440 U.S. 472 (1979); see Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712.
24See American Bar Association Section of Taxation, ‘‘Report
of the Task Force on Judicial Deference,’’ 57 Tax Law. 717, 728
(2004); Coverdale, ‘‘Court Review of Tax Regulations and Rev-
enue Rulings in the Chevron Era,’’ 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 35, 49-50
(1995) (criticizing the distinction); Hickman, ‘‘Coloring Outside
the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance With
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements,’’ 82
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1727, 1761 (2007). That purported distinction
was occasionally accepted by the courts. E.g., Abbott Laboratories
v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 96, 110 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2008). The Court
in Mayo admitted that it, too, had sometimes drawn that
distinction. Mayo, 131 S.Ct. at 713.
25See, e.g., Hickman, ‘‘A Problem of Remedy: Responding to
Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure
Act Rulemaking Requirements,’’ 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1153
(2008).
26Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713.
27Id. at 713-714.
28Id. at 713.
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this case was its general authority to promulgate
regulations in section 7805. Thus, most IRS regula-
tions will be subject to Chevron deference.
There is an important caveat to the conclusion
that IRS legislative regulations are worthy of Chev-
ron deference. As reflected in Mayo, to merit Chevron
deference, it is important that the IRS use notice and
comment procedures that the APA mandates29:
The Department issued the full-time employee
rule only after notice-and-comment pro-
cedures . . . again a consideration identified in
our precedents as a ‘‘significant’’ sign that a
rule merits Chevron deference. Mead, supra at
230-231; see, e.g., Long Island Care at Home Ltd.
v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173-174 (2007).
The classification of most IRS regulations as
legislative for APA purposes may raise more prob-
lems for the IRS than it wishes to acknowledge. A
study of 232 IRS regulations projects for which
Treasury published final regulations (T.D.s) or no-
tices of proposed rulemaking (NPRMs) between
2003 and 2005 revealed that the IRS followed the
traditional APA process (NPRM followed by final
regulations) less than 60 percent of the time.30
About 90 percent of the projects in which APA
procedures were not followed resulted from the
IRS’s issuance of temporary regulations without
notice and comment.31 Indeed, in more than 90
percent of the projects, whether APA procedures
were followed or not, the IRS determined that APA
section 553(b) did not apply to the regulation in
question.32 After Mayo, that is no longer the case.33
IV. Chevron’s Step 1: Statute Compliance
Section 706 of the APA provides that ‘‘the review-
ing court shall decide all relevant questions of law.’’
That reflects the rather basic pronouncement in
Marbury v. Madison34: ‘‘It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the Judicial department to say
what the law is.’’ Thus, a regulation cannot pass
muster unless the court first finds that the regula-
tion is consistent with the language of the statute. It
is not necessary that the statute have only one
meaning, but the regulation must comport with a
possible meaning of the statute.
A short discussion of the substance of Chevron’s
two-step analysis is impossible. The courts have
applied the decision in myriad cases, and there is no
easy summary of how they approach its applica-
tion. Accordingly, the Chevron approach does not
lead to uniform, predictable results. A careful em-
pirical study of post-Chevron cases concludes that
even after Chevron, judges’ decisions are signifi-
cantly influenced by their own personal beliefs —
conservative judges continue to rule conservatively
and liberal judges continue to rule liberally.35
An example of a step-one Chevron case is INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca.36 Until 1980, an alien was eligible
for asylum only if ‘‘it is more likely than not that the
alien would be subject to persecution.’’ A 1980
amendment authorizes asylum if an alien has a
‘‘well-founded fear of persecution.’’ The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service said that was essen-
tially the same test, but the Court held that that was
not the case. The first test is objective; the second
has subjective elements. Moreover, the fact that
Congress changed the language is an indication that
the tests are not the same.
In applying step one of Chevron, the Court has
indicated that it will use ‘‘traditional tools of statu-
tory construction.’’37 What those tools are38 and
whether their use is appropriate are subjects of
considerable controversy. Unfortunately, different
judges may rely on the same tool and come to
29Id. at 714. As noted supra, text accompanying notes 18-21,
the Court in Mead left open the possibility that Chevron defer-
ence would be given to rules not promulgated with a notice and
comment procedure.
30Hickman, supra note 25.
31The DOJ will continue to argue that temporary regulations
deserve Chevron deference, apparently relying on the rule in 5
U.S.C. section 553(b)(B) that notice and comment procedures
need not be used if doing so would be ‘‘impracticable, unnec-
essary, or contrary to the public interest,’’ but won’t argue for
Chevron deference for proposed regulations. See Sapirie, supra
note 21. Section 7805(e)(1) now requires the IRS to issue
proposed regulations whenever it issues temporary regulations.
However, it does not follow that the temporary regulations will
necessarily merit Chevron deference if accompanied by pro-
posed regulations.
32Hickman, supra note 25, at 1749. Apparently, that followed
from instructions in the IRS Manual. Id. at 1749 n.91. Hickman
asserts that it shouldn’t matter if the IRS disclaims the need for
compliance with the APA procedures if it follows them anyway.
33Whether the issuance of temporary and proposed regula-
tions is in compliance with the APA’s good cause exception is
discussed in Part IX, below.
345 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803).
35Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein, ‘‘Do Judges Make Regu-
latory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron,’’ 73 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 823 (2006). In the years immediately after Chevron was
decided, that seems not to have been the case, and how Chevron
would be applied was more predictable. See Peter H. Schuck
and E. Donald Elliot, ‘‘To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law,’’ 1990 Duke L.J. 984;
Richard L. Revesz, ‘‘Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and
the D.C. Circuit,’’ 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997).
36480 U.S. 421 (1987).
37Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
38Possible tools include congressional purpose, canons of
construction, legislative history, and the plain meaning of the
statute.
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opposite conclusions.39 Prof. Richard Pierce, in the
leading administrative law textbook, argues that
allowing courts to use the full gamut of tools of
statutory construction would virtually eliminate the
deference courts should be paying to administrative
action.40 He advocates limiting the tools to plain
meaning (limited to any definition in a reputable
dictionary) and the constitutional avoidance canon
(strike down an administrative construction of am-
biguous language that raises a serious constitu-
tional question). He is particularly wary of allowing
the courts, rather than the administrative agencies,
to use legislative history.
Tax lawyers have experienced the problem of
deciding whether a statute is clear on its face in the
section 6501(e) controversy. The section 6501(a)
question that courts have confronted recently is
whether the statute of limitations governing a tax
liability resulting from the disallowance of inflated
basis is six years because the inflation results in a
substantial understatement of income. The Seventh
Circuit in Beard v. Commissioner41 held that the
taxpayer loses under the first Chevron step — the
statute’s language clearly supports the govern-
ment’s position. On the other hand, the Fourth
Circuit, in Home Concrete & Supply LLC v. United
States,42 relying in part on a Supreme Court deci-
sion,43 held that the statute unambiguously favors
the taxpayer. That controversy will presumably be
settled by the Supreme Court, which accepted cer-
tiorari and has heard arguments in Home Concrete.44
V. Chevron’s Step 2: Approved Interpretation?
Many cases that require a Chevron analysis reach
step two. But the test appears to be a difficult one to
apply. Pierce says45:
It seems apparent that step two of Chevron is
State Farm [Motor Vehicle Manufactures Ass’n v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983)]. The Court has never explicitly so
held, but it has applied Chevron step two in
that manner in many cases, including Chevron
and Smiley [v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735
(1996)]. . . . Thus, a court’s task in applying
Chevron step two is to determine: (1) whether
the agency adequately discussed plausible al-
ternatives, (2) whether the agency adequately
discussed the relationship between the inter-
pretation and pursuit of the goals of the stat-
ute, (3) whether the agency adequately
discussed the relationship between the inter-
pretation and the structure of the statute, in-
cluding the context in which the language
appears in the statute, and (4) whether the
agency adequately discussed the relationship
between the interpretation and any data avail-
able with respect to the factual predicates for
the interpretation.
That description clearly focuses on the reasons
given by the administrative agency in considering
and finalizing its regulations. Without notice and
comment, it is not easy to satisfy those require-
ments.
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court consid-
ered a Board of Immigration Appeals policy for de-
ciding when an alien can apply to the attorney
general for relief from deportation. The Court evalu-
ated the policy based on whether it was arbitrary or
capricious under APA section 706(2)(A). Although
acknowledging that the scope of its review was nar-
row, in light of the expertise of the agency, the Court
asserted that its role was to ensure that the agency
‘‘engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.’’ The gov-
ernment argued that the Court should apply Chev-
ron’s step two. The Court’s response was twofold.
First, citing Mayo, the Court said its analysis would
be the same as its section 706(2)(A) analysis, because
Mayo characterized Chevron’s step two as asking
whether the agency interpretation was ‘‘arbitrary or
capricious in substance.’’46 More interestingly, the
39E.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier Corp., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) (two
opinions reach opposite conclusions relying on congressional
intent); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (majority and dissent
construe statute to avoid grave doubts about constitutionality,
and reach opposite conclusions). In other cases, the justices rely
on different canons and reach opposite conclusions. E.g., Public
Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (majority
relies on legislative history; dissent relies on plain meaning). For
useful discussions of particular canons, see Stephen Breyer, ‘‘On
the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes,’’ 65
U.S.C. L. Rev. 845 (1992); Michael Herz, ‘‘Judicial Textualism
Meets Congressional Micromanagement; A Potential Collision
in Clean Air Act Interpretation,’’ 16 Harv. Env. L. Rev. 175 (1992).
40Richard J. Pierce Jr., Administrative Law Treatise 238-240
(2010). For a general discussion, see Adrian Vermeule, ‘‘Inter-
pretive Choice,’’ 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74 (2000). On the use of plain
meaning, see Frederick Schauer, ‘‘Statutory Construction and
the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning,’’ 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev.
231.
41633 F.3d 616 (2011), Doc 2011-1764, 2011 TNT 18-10.
42634 F.3d 249 (2011), Doc 2011-2674, 2011 TNT 26-7.
43Colony Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 37 (1958).
44The order granting certiorari is available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/092711zr.pdf. A
transcript of the oral argument, which was held on January 17,
can be found at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_argu
ments/argument_transcripts/11-139.pdf. The justices in the oral
argument seemed concerned with trying to determine when a
statute is ‘‘ambiguous.’’
45Pierce, supra note 40, at 219.
46Judulang v. Holder, 181 L. Ed. 2d 449 (2011) (slip op. at 9 n.7),
citing Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711 (quoting Household Services Inc. v.
Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004)).
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Court held that Chevron did not apply because there
was no statute to interpret. The statute gave the
administrator the authority to allow an alien into the
country even if the alien had run afoul of enumer-
ated grounds for exclusion. The agency, as a matter
of equity, extended that discretion to cases of de-
portation.47 Because the statute did not discuss de-
portation, the Court fell back on its usual standard
of whether the agency’s actions were arbitrary or
capricious, without reference to Chevron precedents.
If that has any broader significance, it may allow
courts more latitude in evaluating agency actions
that are not clearly tied to particular statutory
language. Take, for example, the controversy over
whether an innocent spouse is subject to a two-year
deadline to ask for equitable relief under section
6015(f).48 As the Third Circuit said in upholding the
IRS’s position imposing the two-year limit:
Section 6015 tells us nothing about when
claims may be brought under subsection (f) as
the section does not address this point.49
The court then went on to analyze the validity of
the IRS position using a Chevron analysis. In light of
Judulang, it is possible that a court would grant the
IRS’s position less deference if a similar case came
up once it concluded that the statute did not
address the issue.50 Based on Judulang, a conclusion
that the statute did not address the issue would
mean that Chevron was not applicable.
In any event, when Chevron step-two analysis is
appropriate and there is no procedural impediment
to the agency’s issuing its rule, courts likely will
uphold the agency rule in most cases. A study
published in 1998 found that courts upheld the
agency rule in 89 percent of cases in which a
Chevron step-two analysis was conducted.51
VI. Interpretive Regulations — Skidmore
As explained above, it would seem to follow
from Mayo that substantive IRS regulations are
legislative in nature, because they generally are
issued under the authority of a particular code
provision or section 7805. I also note that the DOJ
does not intend to argue that other IRS pronounce-
ments, such as revenue rulings, warrant Chevron
deference.52 Accordingly, they should warrant Skid-
more deference — the courts should consider their
persuasive power in light of the agency’s expertise.
What factors are taken into account in applying
Skidmore deference? One long-recognized factor is
whether the guidance is contemporaneous with the
statute; another is whether it is long standing.53
Certainly, if those two factors are present, the guid-
ance gains additional significance, although it does
not mean courts will necessarily accept an admin-
istrative position that has both factors.54
One example of a court applying Skidmore is
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.55 In that case, the
company’s disability plan excluded benefits for
pregnancy. An Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) guideline required disability
benefits to be applied to disability related to preg-
nancy under the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition of
discrimination because of sex. The Court rejected
the EEOC guideline using the Skidmore standard,
arguing that it was not contemporaneous with the
statute, contradicted an earlier interpretation of the
EEOC, and went against the general tenor of the
legislative history.
Exactly what constitutes the Skidmore standard is
ultimately a subject of debate. A study of cases
decided between 2001 and 2006 that purported to
use Skidmore deference identified two forms of
deference.56 In one, a court exercises independent
judgment in evaluating an agency rule, which boils
47Judulang, 181 L. Ed. 2d 449, slip op. at 16-17 (and n.11):
‘‘Section 212(c) simply has nothing to do with deporta-
tion. . . . Rather, section 212(c) refers solely to exclusion deci-
sions; its extension to deportation cases arose from the agency’s
extra-textual view that some similar relief should be available in
that context to avoid unreasonable distinctions.’’
48This controversy was laid to rest administratively by
CC-2011-017, Doc 2011-16174, 2011 TNT 143-23.
49Manella v. Commissioner, 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011).
50Of course, once Judulang is on the books, a court might
consider the language of the statute more carefully before
asserting that it did not address the issue.
51Orin S. Kerr, ‘‘Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical
Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeal,’’ 15
Yale J. on Reg. 1, 30-31 (1998).
52See Sapirie, supra note 21.
53E.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294,
315 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) (contemporaneous guidance left intact
— this factor was recognized as early as Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827)); United States v. Leslie Salt Co.,
350 U.S. 383, 396 (1956) (position long standing).
54See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213 (1954); Zuber v.
Allen, 396 U.S. 168 (1969) (presence of both factors does not
result in deference). Congressional reenactments that occur after
an administrative position has been promulgated may also be
treated as supporting the administrative position. The Court
took that position in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,
350 U.S. 46, 53 (1955). However, it is probably wise not to put too
much reliance on this factor. For a more balanced statement of
the significance of reenactment, see Mass. Trustees of Easter Gas &
Fuel Assoc. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 241 (1964). The idea of
relying on reenactment is criticized in William N. Eskridge,
‘‘Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Deci-
sions,’’ 101 Yale L.J. 331 (1991). Indeed, the Court itself has
recognized that it has treated reenactment inconsistently. Helv-
ering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 396 n.47 (1943).
55429 U.S. 125 (1976).
56Hickman and Krueger, ‘‘In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard,’’ 107 Columb. L. Rev. 1235 (2007).
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down to virtually no deference at all.57 The other
form has been termed ‘‘sliding scale deference,’’ in
which the court uses a set of factors to determine
how much deference it will give the agency rule.
The factors considered are: ‘‘thoroughness of con-
sideration, agency expertise, validity of the reason-
ing, consistency of application, longevity of the
interpretation, and formality of format — in evalu-
ating the administrative interpretation.’’58 The
study found that in about 75 percent of the cases,
the more deferential sliding scale was used, while
less than 20 percent used the independent judgment
model.59 Not surprisingly, the courts using the
sliding scale approach were more likely to approve
of the agency rule (in about 60 percent of the cases)
than those using the independent judgment ap-
proach (50 percent).60
What seems clear is that Skidmore deference is
less influential in practice than Chevron deference,
under which 89 percent of cases reaching step two
are decided for the agency.61 Skidmore’s exact con-
tours, however, are less clear than Chevron’s and
more subject to each court’s particular approach.
VII. IRS Positions Other Than Regulations
The DOJ has indicated that it will not argue for
Chevron deference for revenue rulings.62 It is helpful
to examine a possible basis for that decision to
evaluate how likely it is to remain in effect.
As indicated above, legislative regulations get
Chevron deference, while interpretive regulations
get the lesser Skidmore deference. The other side of
the coin is that legislative regulations must satisfy
APA requirements — generally, they must be pub-
lished with notice and comment procedures. That
means that if a legislative regulation tries to mas-
querade as an interpretive regulation, it won’t sim-
ply get Skidmore deference. Instead, it will be treated
as an invalid legislative regulation.63
It would be comforting to have clear Supreme
Court precedent distinguishing legislative from in-
terpretive rules, but we do not: the precedent comes
from circuit courts. It is difficult to extract a single
test from the case law.
The clearest explanation may be in American
Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administra-
tion.64 If an agency intends to issue a legislative rule,
it can. And if it uses the notice and comment
procedure, then the rule will be a valid legislative
rule (subject, presumably, to the Chevron tests). If
the agency says that it intends to issue an interpre-
tive rule, the court will be warier, since the agency
may characterize a rule as interpretive in order to
avoid APA procedures. Despite the agency’s asser-
tions, the rule will be treated as legislative if it has
the force of law, and then it will be subject to APA
procedures.
What factors determine that the rule is legisla-
tive? If the rule is essential to support agency
enforcement, it is legislative. A simple example
would be the consolidated return regulations —
without the regulations, there is no guidance about
how consolidated returns should be prepared. Also,
a rule is legislative when the agency ‘‘explicitly
invoke[s] its general legislative authority.’’65 And
finally, a rule that amends or contradicts a legisla-
tive rule must itself be legislative.66
American Mining Congress adds an important
gloss to the last criterion. If an agency issues a
vague and open-ended legislative rule, it cannot
clarify that rule with an interpretative rule — the
clarification itself will be legislative, and hence
subject to notice and comment. The opinion gives as
an example the Park Service’s indication, in a
legislative rule, that specific conditions would ap-
ply to a particular class of permits it issued.67 The
57See Colin S. Diver, ‘‘Statutory Interpretation in the Admin-
istrative State,’’ 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 565 (1985).
58Hickman and Krueger, supra note 56, at 1267-1268.
59Id. at 1271. The remaining cases were indeterminate.
60Id. at 1276.
61Kerr, supra note 51.
62See Sapirie, supra note 21.
63Pierce, supra note 40, at 447. Saltzman asserts that a
procedurally defective legislative regulation has the force of an
interpretive regulation. Michael I. Saltzman, IRS Practice and
Procedure para. 3.02[3][c] (‘‘Interpretive, or more accurately,
‘non-legislative’ rules include interpretive rules, policy state-
ments, and procedurally defective legislative rules’’). Saltz-
man’s source for his assertion is the concurrence of Judges
Halpern and Holmes in Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail
LLC v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 211, 226 (2010), Doc 2010-10163,
2010 TNT 88-12, which states that a court ‘‘should not entirely
ignore invalidated regulations — but we cannot give them
binding force.’’ In a note, the concurring judges add: ‘‘If
respondent had successfully promulgated interpretive rules, we
would reach this same point.’’ However, the opinion then cites,
among other sources, Hickman, ‘‘A Problem of Remedy: Re-
sponding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administra-
tive Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements,’’ 76 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1153, 1197 n.199 (2008) (suggesting invalidated regulations
may be similar in force to proposed regulations, which set forth
the agency’s views but do not bind courts). Hickman cites Butka
v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 110, 130 (1988), for the proposition that
a proposed regulation is ‘‘not a complete nullity.’’ However, it is
not of the same legal status as an interpretive regulation, which
is given Skidmore deference.
64995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
65The court in American Mining Congress also viewed as
significant whether the rule was published in the Code of
Federal Regulations. However, that criterion was later called
just a ‘‘snippet of evidence.’’ See Health Ins. Ass’n of Am. Inc. v.
Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
66995 F.2d at 1110-1111.
67United States v. Piccotto, 875 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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rule indicated that a permit could contain ‘‘addi-
tional reasonable conditions.’’ Later, in a purported
interpretative rule, it added a specific ‘‘mandatory
condition.’’ The court said that would be treated as
a legislative rule, requiring compliance with the
APA. Essentially, courts view a vague legislative
rule followed by a detailed ‘‘interpretative’’ rule as
an end run around the APA, which they will not
permit.68 The Supreme Court has expressed its
concern about a specific manifestation of that ad-
ministrative ploy in an ‘‘anti-parroting’’ canon: If
the legislative regulation simply parrots the lan-
guage of the statute, a court will not grant deference
to an ‘‘interpretative’’ rule that interprets that leg-
islative rule.69 Pierce approves of the American
Mining Congress test, which has been followed in at
least seven other circuits.70
As Pierce points out, however, there is another
standard, which was articulated by the D.C. Circuit.
In Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena,71 the
D.C. Circuit stated that a rule is legislative if it
amends a prior interpretation of a legislative rule.
In other words, the rule can be legislative if it
amends an interpretative rule. Later cases in the
D.C. Circuit have followed that view,72 as has the
Fifth Circuit.73 The Third Circuit has a case follow-
ing Paralyzed Veterans to go with its decision follow-
ing American Mining Congress.74
If a court strictly followed Paralyzed Veterans, the
IRS would be in a terrible bind. Assuming revenue
rulings are interpretative, any change in position
taken in one would be legislative. The result? The
revenue ruling would have to be issued under the
APA’s notice and comment procedures.
VIII. Agency’s Interpretation of Its Own Rules
A different standard of deference, Auer75 defer-
ence, applies when an agency interprets its own
rules. In that situation, the interpretation will be
controlling unless ‘‘plainly erroneous or inconsis-
tent with the regulation.’’76
The agency interpretation can come in a variety
of forms, even in a brief in the litigation. The court
simply must be convinced that the agency interpre-
tation reflects its ‘‘fair and considered judgment on
the matter in question.’’77 What won’t pass muster
is an agency’s ‘‘post-hoc rationalization’’ of action
that is under judicial review.78
This strong deference to administrative action
has two important qualifications. First, in Gonzales
v. Oregon,79 the Supreme Court refused to give
deference to an agency interpretation of a regula-
tion that simply parroted the statute. The logic of
that refusal is that deference is given to regulations
that have the benefit of notice and comment. If the
regulation simply parrots the statute, there is little
gained from the regulation, and the agency is just
interpreting the statute, not its own regulation.
Second, Auer deference is not given to an inter-
pretation of a regulation that will lead to a penalty,
whether civil or criminal. Due process consid-
erations limit the ability of an agency to clarify rules
that can result in a penalty imposed on someone
who acted before the clarification was available.80
We can ask whether the same logic should apply
to limit Chevron deference in a penalty context.
Moreover, if there is reason to give less than Chevron
deference when violation of a regulation leads to a
penalty, or less than Auer deference where an
agency interprets its own regulation regarding a
penalty, should that lesser deference apply to IRS
regulations that affect a tax liability, not something
denominated a penalty? In other words, can in-
creased taxes be viewed as a penalty in that context?
This question is particularly pointed when the IRS
is simply running a nontax program through the
code. An example to consider would be an IRS
determination that a pension plan is nonqualified
68See, e.g., Mission Group Kansas v. Riley, 146 F.3d 775 (10th
Cir. 1998).
69Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). See infra note 79. The
Court granted Skidmore deference to the rule in question. Id. at
263-264.
70Pierce, supra note 40, at 454, 456, citing Warder v. Shalala, 149
F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 1998); New York City Employees’ Retirement
System v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995); Appalachian States
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission v. O’Leary, 93 F.3d 103
(3d Cir. 1996); Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir.
1995); Hoctor v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996);
Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 333 F.3d 1082,
1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pierce mentions the Ninth Circuit in his text
but does not provide case support); Mission Group Kansas, supra
note 68. Two D.C. Circuit cases that follow American Mining
Congress are Truckers United for Safety v. Federal Highway Admin-
istration, 139 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1998) and Aulenback v. Federal
Highway Administration, 103 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Also
following American Mining Congress is National Organization of
Veterans Advocates v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2001). The concurrence by Judges Halpern and
Holmes in Intermountain, supra note 63, noted the primacy of the
American Mining Congress standard.
71117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
72E.g., Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
73Shell Offshore v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2001).
74SBC v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 2005); compare Appalachian
States, supra note 70.
75Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
76Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945),
quoted in Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
77Talk Am. Inc. v. Mich. Bell Telephone Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2263
(2011), citing Auer, supra note 75, at 462.
78Talk Am., supra note 77, citing Burlington Truck Lines Inc. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-169 (1962).
79546 U.S. 243 (2006).
80See generally Pierce, supra note 40, at 543-553.
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because it violated the nondiscrimination rules.
Failure to satisfy those rules results in a disallow-
ance of amounts paid into the plan, leading to an
additional tax liability that could be viewed as a
penalty because it does not stem from any change in
the real income recognized by the taxpayer-
employer. There would seem to be an argument
that the resulting tax is a penalty for the purpose of
deciding what level of deference should be given to
a regulation promulgated by the IRS that defines
what constitutes nondiscrimination.
Justice Antonin Scalia has raised the specter of a
further, drastic limitation on Auer deference. In Talk
America Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., he sug-
gests that Auer deference is misguided because it
encourages agencies to draft unclear regulations
rather than having a clear regulation subject to the
scrutiny of notice and comment procedures. He said
that deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its
own rule ‘‘encourages an agency to draft vague
rules which give it the power, in future adjudica-
tions, to do what it pleases. This frustrates the
notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking,
and promotes arbitrary government.’’81
IX. The Good Cause Exception
Section 553(b)(B) of the APA allows an agency to
dispense with notice and comment if it finds that
those procedures are ‘‘impracticable, unnecessary,
or contrary to the public interest.’’ Section 553(d)(3)
allows an agency to have a rule with an effective
date less than 30 days after publication of the rule
‘‘for good cause found.’’ In both cases, the agency
must give its reasons for deviating from the normal
rule.
As indicated before, the IRS often publishes
regulations, particularly temporary regulations,
without complying fully with the notice and com-
ment procedures, and those temporary regulations
often have effective dates less than 30 days from
publication.82 With the likelihood that more atten-
tion will now be paid to the IRS’s compliance with
the APA, can that practice hold up to scrutiny?
Pierce gives two reasons why agencies invoke the
good cause exception.83 One is ‘‘an urgent need to
issue a rule to govern a particularly problematic
area of conduct.’’ For example, in Jifry v. FAA,84 the
Federal Aviation Administration issued a new rule
without notice and comment requiring automatic
suspension of a foreign national’s pilot’s certificate
if the Transportation Security Administration noti-
fies the FAA that the pilot poses a security threat.
That rule was issued in the wake of the 9/11 attacks,
and the court pointed to those attacks as a sign of
the emergency situation that justified issuing the
rule without notice and comment. On the other
hand, when the Drug Enforcement Administration
wanted to accelerate the effective date of a rule
classifying a drug as having a high potential for
abuse, the court said there was no good cause in the
absence of a showing of an ‘‘acute and immediate
threat to public health.’’85
A more likely basis for the IRS arguing good
cause is the second reason identified by Pierce: An
agency believes that prior notice will distort a
pattern of transactions.86 Pierce observes that this
reason is often invoked in economic regulation. For
example, giving notice of price freezing of season
football tickets would lead to ‘‘a massive rush to
raise prices.’’87 The IRS’s issuance of a rule to
prevent use of a transaction it views as abusive
would seem to be a natural basis for ignoring notice
and comment.
Pierce observes that when agencies go that route
they often characterize the regulation as temporary,
with the simultaneous issuance of matching pro-
posed regulations. That has certainly been a com-
mon practice for the IRS, and it is now required by
statute.88 Although Pierce urges courts to encourage
that practice,89 he cites no authority indicating that
courts have required the simultaneous issuance of
proposed regulations. Now that Mayo has put the
IRS on notice that it is subject to the APA, courts
probably will be asked to look more carefully at the
IRS’s procedures.
81131 S. Ct. 2266. He refers the reader to a fuller discussion in
John Manning, ‘‘Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference
to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,’’ 96 Columb. L. Rev.
512 (1996). Scalia dissented forcefully in Gonzales, supra note 69,
arguing that there was no basis for the Court’s ‘‘anti-parroting’’
position. It is not clear whether his concurrence in Talk America
reflects a retreat from that position.
82Hickman, supra note 24, and text accompanying note 25.
83Pierce, supra note 40, at 672.
84370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
85United States v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099, 1105 (8th Cir.
1977).
86Pierce, supra note 40, section 7.10, p. 674.
87DeRieux v. Five Smiths Inc., 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emerg. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974).
88Section 7805(e)(1). It could be argued that the specific
reference to temporary regulations in section 7805(e)(1) reflects
congressional approval of the IRS issuing temporary regulations
without compliance with the APA. This argument has been
considered and rejected in the literature. See Michael Asimow,
‘‘Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regu-
lations,’’ 44 Tax Law., 343, 362, 364 (1991); Hickman, supra note
25, at 1739.
89Pierce, supra note 40, at 676.
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X. Retroactive Rules
If administrative action is justified under Chev-
ron’s step two, it means that a court has found that
the agency’s action ‘‘is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.’’ That means there is
more than one permissible construction, and the
agency’s actions reflect one of those constructions.
It follows that an agency should be permitted to
change the construction it gives a statute as long as
it follows the proper procedures in promulgating its
decision.90 In making such a change, it must explain
its actions, take into account legitimate reliance on
the prior position, and may not be arbitrary, capri-
cious, or abuse its discretion.91 It may even take a
position contrary to a prior court decision, as long
as the court did not conclude that its interpretation
satisfied Chevron’s step one and allowed for only
one interpretation.92
Because Mayo recognized the IRS’s power in
promulgating regulations, tax practitioners may
well find the agency being more aggressive in
pushing its favored positions through regulations.
The extent to which it can change its published
positions must be clarified.
A. The Statutory Structure — Section 7805
Before the Taxpayer Bill of Rights II,93 Congress
created a special rule that applied to the retroactiv-
ity of IRS regulations and rulings. Section 7805(b)
said:
The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any,
to which any ruling or regulation, relating to
the internal revenue laws, shall be applied
without retroactive effect.
Thus, the default under the statute was that any
ruling or regulation would apply retroactively.
That approach was turned on its head by the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights II. Under current section
7805(b)(1), a regulation, whether final, temporary,
or proposed, cannot normally have an effective date
before the earlier of (i) the date the final regulation
is published in the Federal Register, (ii) the date that
any notice substantially describing the proposed,
temporary, or final regulation is published, or (iii) in
the case of a final regulation, the date the proposed
or temporary regulation to which it relates is pub-
lished. There are six exceptions:
1. regulations issued within 18 months of the
enactment of the statute to which the regula-
tion relates;
2. regulations issued to prevent abuse;
3. regulations that correct a procedural defect
in a previously issued regulation;
4. regulations relating to internal practices or
procedures;
5. regulations issued under a legislative grant
to prescribe a different effective date; and
6. regulations to the extent taxpayers may elect
to apply them retroactively.
Amended section 7805(b) continues to allow pro-
nouncements other than regulations to be issued
with retroactive effect.94 The change in retroactive
effect applies to regulations that relate to statutory
provisions enacted on or after July 30, 1996. Note
that this effective date is not based on the date the
regulation was issued but on the date the statute
was enacted. The IRS can continue to issue regula-
tions with retroactive effect under the prior version
of section 7805(b) for statutory provisions enacted
before July 30, 1996. Congress’s actions suggest that
in drafting future legislation, it will take into ac-
count the more limited power it has given the IRS to
issue retroactive regulations.
B. The Judicial Gloss
The Supreme Court provided strong authority
against retroactive application of regulations in
Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital.95 However,
that opinion is not of central importance in tax
litigation96 because it focused on whether the ad-
ministrative agency had the power to promulgate
retroactive rules. As discussed above, the code has
long had explicit rules governing the IRS’s power to
promulgate retroactive rules.
Thus, the limits on retroactive rulemaking would
appear to come from the APA and general prin-
ciples of fairness. The APA discusses the scope of
judicial review of administrative actions and states,
in part97:
90Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Ass’n v. State Farm Automobile
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
91Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996).
92Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). The Supreme Court might elaborate
on that in its Home Concrete decision. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 41-44. In the oral argument of Home Concrete, Justice
Breyer expressed concern with the fairness of the IRS’s retroac-
tive regulation. Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly asked whether
Brand X has ever been applied to a Supreme Court decision (it
has not).
93P.L. 104-168, section 1101(a).
94Section 7805(b)(8). However, rulings do not have the same
status as regulations, with some courts taking the position that
they are no more than a statement of the position of one of the
parties. See Butka v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 110, 130 (1988).
95488 U.S. 204 (1988).
96The Federal Circuit made that point in Grapevine Imports
Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2011), Doc
2011-5233, 2011 TNT 49-14; see also Saltzman, supra note 63, at
para. 3.02[4].
975 U.S.C. section 706(e).
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The reviewing court shall —
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found
to be —
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right,
power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right.
That provision is not novel. As explained in the
1947 Attorney General’s Manual on the APA (‘‘the
Government’s own most authoritative interpreta-
tion of the APA,’’98), those criteria ‘‘restate the scope
of the judicial function in reviewing final agency
action.’’99
When an administrative agency attempts to ap-
ply a rule retroactively, courts apply a balancing test
to determine whether retroactive application runs
afoul of section 10(e). In NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson
Co.,100 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
wished to enforce a new standard to declare the
respondent guilty of an unfair labor practice. The
court refused to apply the new rule retroactively,
saying the iniquity of retroactive policymaking on
an innocent party was ‘‘manifest.’’ The court rea-
soned that the fact that an administrative agency
may be favored in its interpretation of its own rules
does not mean that it has any special authority to
determine when its actions should be retroactive.101
In NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co.,102 the NLRB
petitioned to enforce an order ruling that the re-
spondent gave unlawful assistance to a union. The
respondent’s activities were permissible when they
were done, but later became unlawful under a new
NLRB rule. The court said:
A decision branding as ‘‘unfair’’ conduct
stamped ‘‘fair’’ at the time a party acted, raises
judicial hackles. . . . And the hackles bristle
still more when a financial penalty is assessed
for action that might well have been avoided if
the agency’s changed disposition had been
earlier made known, or might even have been
taken in express reliance on the standard pre-
viously established.103
In Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v.
NLRB,104 the court set forth five considerations for
determination that a rule should be made retroac-
tive:
1. whether the case is one of first impression;
2. whether the new rule represents an abrupt
departure from well-established practice or
merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled
area of law;
3. the extent to which the party against whom
the new rule is applied relied on the former
rule;
4. the burden a retroactive order imposes on a
party; and
5. the statutory interest in applying a new rule
despite a party’s reliance on the old standard.
The retroactivity doctrine has been applied in
cases involving tax liabilities.105 With the tax bar
now required to focus more clearly on the possible
application of administrative law authorities to tax
litigation, the issue may get further scrutiny.
XI. One Last Look at Mayo
It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will
reconsider its position in Mayo when it considers
Home Concrete. Still, it is worth noting that despite
the Court’s conclusion to the contrary in Mayo,
there may well be reasons that Chevron should not
be applied to decisions reached in the context of tax
administration.
The Court in Chevron emphasized the greater
political accountability of agencies as compared
with courts.106 Administrative law scholars recog-
nize that not all agencies are equally independent.
For example, Cass Sunstein has qualified a state-
ment that administrators have electoral account-
ability, saying:
98Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
99See the 1947 Attorney General’s Manual, at 108-109, avail-
able at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/APA/REFERENC
ES/REFERENCE_WORKS/AGTC.HTM.
100195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952).
101Id. at 149 (footnote omitted).
102355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966).
103Id. at 860.
104466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
105E.g., Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110
(1939) (Court also influenced by reenactment of statute); Elkins
v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 669, 681 (1983) (‘‘It would constitute an
abuse of discretion for [the commissioner] first to state a concise
rule through the medium of an official pronouncement and then
belatedly to alter that rule to the substantial disadvantage of a
taxpayer who had meanwhile acted in reliance on the most
reasonable interpretation of it’’); LeCroy Res. System Corp. v.
Commissioner, 751 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Chock Full
O’Nuts Corp. v. United States, 453 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1971)
(promulgation of retroactive regulation during the course of
litigation is ‘‘questionable’’).
106467 U.S. at 865-866.
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Of course, ‘‘independent’’ agencies — those
whose heads are appointed for fixed terms
and are not subject to plenary removal power
— are to a degree insulated from presidential
policy making. . . . Moreover, shifts in the judi-
ciary are a predictable consequence of shifts in
the administration, and in this sense courts are
not wholly independent. Finally, agencies are
sometimes subject to narrow or parochial pres-
sures. Their decisions can hardly be said to
track the public will in all cases. These quali-
fications do not, however, undermine the basic
claim that the democratic pedigree of the
agency is usually superior to that of the
court.107
That might suggest that Chevron deference could
operate differently when applied to the pronounce-
ments of different agencies, depending on how
much electoral accountability they have. I have not
found anyone who makes that suggestion, how-
ever, perhaps because, even in independent agen-
cies, political shifts that affect enforcement are quite
significant, although their effect is perhaps not quite
as immediate as for other agencies.108
The problem with applying that analysis to the
IRS is that it is much more insulated from political
changes than other agencies for two reasons. First,
from a political science standpoint, the IRS has
‘‘observable outputs and outcomes’’ that make it
‘‘more responsive to statutory mandates than to
fluctuations in the political preferences.’’109 A study
of IRS audits concluded that ‘‘political influence is
not too strong’’ in IRS operations.110 However, the
IRS is not unique in that regard.
The second reason to conclude that the IRS is
insulated from the political process relates to its
history. In the early 1950s, a major investigation of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (predecessor of the
IRS) uncovered significant corruption in the admin-
istration of the tax laws.111 As a result of the
investigation, the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue between 1944 and 1947 was indicted for
income tax evasion, the assistant AG in charge of
the tax division was removed from office by the
president, the chief counsel of the Bureau resigned
his office, and nine of the 64 collectors of internal
revenue (the predecessors of district directors) were
removed from office or forced to resign. Among the
consequences of that investigation, all IRS posi-
tions, except for the commissioner and the chief
counsel, became civil service appointments.112 Ac-
cordingly, the IRS is not intended to be subject to
political changes the same way other administrative
agencies are. Since then, the IRS has had a tradition
of being fiercely protective of its independent sta-
tus.113 And, with only two political appointees (and
their assistants) coming in with any new adminis-
tration, there is not much ability to make substan-
tive changes in IRS positions. That has been
strengthened in recent years because commission-
ers often have been chosen for their ability to run a
large operation rather than for their substantive tax
expertise.114 While it remains true that the IRS has
107Sunstein, ‘‘Law and Administration After Chevron,’’ 90
Columb. L. Rev. 2071, 2087 at n. 80 (1990).
108See, e.g., Michael Harper, ‘‘Judicial Control of the National
Labor Relations Board’s Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron and
Brand X,’’ 89 B. U. L. Rev. 189, 189-191 (2009); James O’Reilly,
‘‘Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Re-
view, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise,’’ 93 Cornell
L. Rev. 939 (2008).
109The generalizations come from James Q. Wilson, Bureau-
cracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (Basic
Books 1989), as summarized in Mehriye Mete, ‘‘Bureaucratic
Behavior in Strategic Environments: Politicians, Taxpayers and
the IRS,’’ 64 J. Pol. 384, 401 (2002). For a general review of the
interactions between political science theories and rules of
deference, see Bradley Lipton, ‘‘Accountability, Deference, and
the Skidmore Doctrine,’’ 119 Yale L.J. 2096 (2010).
110Mehriye Mete, ‘‘Bureaucratic Behavior in Strategic Envi-
ronments: Politicians, Taxpayers and the IRS,’’ 64 J. Pol. 384, 401
(2002).
111House Ways and Means Committee, King Committee
Report. A detailed description of the results of the investigation
can be found in Appendix B. Allusions to the problems that
were uncovered in that investigation can be found in President
Truman’s message accompanying Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1952. (H. Doc. 327), U.S. G.C.A.N. 931, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. (1952).
112Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1952, 17 Fed. Reg. 2.243, 66 Stat. 823.
113Probably the best known example is the refusal by Com-
missioner Donald Alexander (himself a political appointee) to
act on President Nixon’s ‘‘enemies list.’’ See, e.g., Michael Joe,
‘‘Former IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander Dies at 87,’’ Tax
Notes, Feb. 9, 2009, p. 703, Doc 2009-2239, or 2009 TNT 21-4. My
own experience at Treasury’s Office of Tax Legislative Counsel
suggests the power of the nonpolitical bureaucrats at the IRS. As
the line attorney at Treasury in charge of farmers’ cooperatives,
I received regular visits from the head of one of the nation’s
biggest farmer cooperatives, which was based in Georgia,
President Carter’s home state. He was asking for a change in the
treatment of cooperatives, which we agreed internally should be
made. However, the head of the IRS group that had to sign off
on the change was deeply suspicious of co-operatives and was
greatly concerned that they would use any change to elude the
corporate tax. After many meetings with IRS personnel, and
many tentative agreements, I left Treasury without any change
having been made. When I had been out of Treasury for a few
years, the chief counsel called me into his office to review the
co-operative situation. After reviewing it with me, he agreed to
one approach we had proposed and said he would make the
change. The change was never made administratively — it
required a statutory amendment.
114That distinction between the IRS and other agencies is
reduced to the extent the Treasury assistant secretary for tax
policy must sign off on regulations before the IRS can publish
them. Reg. section 301.7805-1(a). Still the premise on which
Chevron deference is based may be misdirected when applied to
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technical expertise have, there are few aspects of
political accountability to support deference to IRS
decisions.
Moreover, the IRS’s technical tax expertise (al-
though perhaps not its sensitivity to administrative
concerns) is shared by the Tax Court, whose mem-
bers come to the court after years of tax practice. Yet
appellate courts do not grant the Tax Court any-
thing like the deference they would grant to the IRS
under Chevron or Skidmore. Indeed, there is no
suggestion that the Tax Court believes that it can
exercise any lesser deference in reviewing IRS pro-
nouncements than other courts do. One can at least
wonder whether a mechanical application of Chev-
ron to IRS pronouncements is totally justified.
XII. Conclusion
The discussion above does little more than
scratch the surface of the issues that tax practi-
tioners will have to deal with as they adapt to the
Mayo decision. Unlike the tax rules, the law of
judicial deference to administrative agencies’ rule-
making involves little statutory guidance but very
substantial, if confusing, judicial authority. It is not
easy to predict how the courts will deal with the
intersection of administrative law and tax law.
the IRS. While that may not be a basis for totally ignoring
Chevron in tax cases, it may suggest some moderation in the
application of the doctrine.
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